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ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW BY DOMESTIC 
COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES" 
M. SHAH ALAM"" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While there are sufficient norms of international law to regulate 
protection and promotion of human rights worldwide, these norms are 
not accompanied by sufficiently strong international mechanisms to 
enforce them in state territories. ,On the other hand, the potential of 
domestic courts to enforce international norms has remained largely 
unused. There exist widely divergent perceptions of the states regarding 
the relationship between international law and domestic law. This 
explains why state practice on domestic implementation of international 
law varies greatly. 
Country specific studies reveal a very interesting picture of domestic 
implementation of the norms of international law, especially 
international human rights norms. Undoubtedly, the United States would 
make the most interesting and peculiar country specific case study of the 
problem of domestic enforcement of international human rights law. 
The U.S. practice in this regard is a bundle of contradictions. While the 
constitutional position of domestic enforcement of international law in 
* This is one of the articles on a related topic, materials for which were collected and worked 
out by the author during his stay as a Senior Fulbright Scholar at New York University School of 
Law in 2002. The author wishes to express his thanks to the authorities of NYU School of Law and 
the Fulbright Program for assistance. 
** Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Chitta gong, Bangladesh. 
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the United States would seem most ideal, the practical aspects of it are 
not. However, the U.S. practice more than any other national jurisdiction 
sheds light on the complex nature of the problem of domestic 
enforcement of international human rights law. 
The U.S. Constitution, Article VI provides that " ... all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding."l On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has ruled that customary international law is "part of our law, and must 
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate 
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly 
presented for their determination."2 
Both treaties and international customs supersede all inconsistent state 
and local laws and also earlier inconsistent federal laws, but not the 
Constitution. This position is congenial to domestic enforcement of 
international human rights law.3 In reality, however, the legal position is 
marred by series of exceptions and deviations, which, in fact have 
become laws themselves to hide the actual legal position. 
Division of treaties into self-executing and non-self-executing, and 
discretion of the organs of the state to declare any treaty non-self-
executing has substantially narrowed constitutional scope for direct 
application of treaties.4 On the other hand, Filartiga V. Pena-lrala5 
notwithstanding, the U.S. courts are often found reluctant to engage in 
vigorous intellectual exercises to construct customary international laws 
from universal state practices and apply them within their jurisdiction. 
1. u.s. Const. art. VI, § 2. 
2. The Paquete Habana. 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900). 
3. Louis Henkin, International Human Rights Standards in National Law: The Jurisprudence 
of the United States, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS, ED. 
BENEDETTO CONFORTI AND FRANCISCO FRANCIONI 203 (1997). 
4. Treaties in the United States have been so described and divided into self-executing and 
non-self-executing by a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Foster v. Neilson (1829). A treaty is 
said to be self-executing when its provisions are directly applied within domestic jurisdiction with-
out implementing legislation. On the other hand, non-self-executing treaty would require implement-
ing legislation. However, terms of self-executing and non-self-executing treaties are not clear. The 
self-execution question has intensely complicated the issue of implementation of treaties in the 
United States with far reaching consequences. 
5. In the landmark decision Filartiga v. Pena-lrala (1980), the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit directly applied international customary law to provide relief to the victims of tor-
ture. 
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Moreover, whether it is treaty norm or customary norm, any attempt on 
the part of the judiciary to enforce international law can be blocked by 
later-in-time enactment by the congress. Initiatives and activities of the 
courts can also be squeezed by the doctrines of sovereign immunity of 
the state, act of the state, political question, forum non conveniens, and 
resultant deference to political branches of the government. 
The U.S. contribution to the cause of human rights is undeniable.6 It 
emanates from the democratic nature of its polity. The Bill of Rights 
enshrined in the U.S. Constitution more than two hundred years ago still 
occupy a most noble position amongst an array of rights envisaged by 
contemporary human rights law. Since World War n the United States 
has played a major role in the political and legal movement that aimed 
not only at spreading the message of human rights worldwide, but also 
devising international mechanism to protect and to promote human 
rights. The United States as a great political and economic power has 
taken an interest in human rights situations in other countries and has 
often conditioned its aid programs by the need to improve human rights 
conditions in those countries.? 
While the U.S. domestic human rights records are commendable, direct 
application of international human rights instruments in the U.S. 
territories is not. This is a contradiction which manifests itself in poor 
U.S. ratification records of human rights treaties, in the sweeping 
reservations, understandings and declarations (R DDs) attached to ratified 
treaties, 8 and in attempts to endow all treaties with non-self-executing 
status. This contradiction also manifests itself in the U.S. courts' 
insufficient use of international treaty and customary norms to assert 
jurisdiction. 
There are not many human rights norms found in the international 
instruments which are not available in the U.S. laws and customs.9 This 
6. U.s. contribution towards drafting and adopting of international human rights instruments 
are too well-known to require any mention; Bert Lockwood, Toward the Economic Brown: Eco-
nomic Rights in the United States and the Possible Contribution of International Human Rights Law, 
in WORLD JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS AND INT'LHUMAN RIGHTS 153-154 (Mark Gibney ed., 1991). 
7. David P. Forsythe, U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights: The Price of Principles After 
the Cold War, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMPARATNE FOREIGN POLICY 39-40 (2000); THOMAS 
BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 232-233 (1988). 
8. Paul L. Hoffman and Nadine Strossen, Enforcing International Human Rights Law in the 
United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY (Louis Henkin and John 
Lawrence Hargrove eds., 2000), 26 STUDIES IN TRANSNAT'L LEGAL POL'y 480 (ASIL 1994); 
THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 226 (1988); Henkin, 
supra note 3, at 196. 
9. John M. Rogers, International Human Rights Law and U.S. Law, in WORLD JUSTICE? U.S. 
COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 107,110-11 (Mark Gibney ed., 1991). 
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position poses little problem for the human rights treaties to be self-
executing in nature, and hence enforceable by U.S. courts. Moreover, 
reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) can always be 
used when there is any inconsistency with domestic laws. Yet, the 
executive and the legislature are apprehensive of judicial interference. 
Do the president and the senate fear that the courts will over-implement 
the international instruments? 
Historically U.S. courts have acted rationally, and contributed greatly not 
only to constitutional development, but also to the' development of 
human rights law, not usurping the powers and encroaching on the 
jurisdiction of the executive and the legislature. If anything, courts have 
rather demonstrated cautious restraint to use treaties and international 
customs as source of law. Courts have always held domestic norms in 
high esteem, and have been guided by the conviction that the U.S. laws 
attained high degree of maturity sufficient to provide for the enforcement 
of human rights which the international instruments seek to protect. 
Cautious and conservative U.S. attitude towards domestic 
implementation of international human rights norm is also reflected in 
the ideas often expressed in its political and judicial circles that human 
rights issues are a matter for the states to secure for their citizens, and 
that the treaties are not appropriate devices to provide for the protection 
of human rights within state territories. Human rights related treaty 
making power of the U.S. government has also come under question 
however absurd the proposition may sound in the present day world. 10 
Costs of the policies of non-ratification, the making of sweeping 
reservations and declarations on ratified treaties, and U.S. courts' over-
cautiousness to use international human rights law are proving very high, 
because it passes a wrong message to the world community about U.S. 
human rights commitment. Despite the best intentions of the U.S. 
Government and the people, it cannot but have a negative impact on 
world human rights movement. 
While the United States has made protection and promotion of human 
rights worldwide one of its main objectives of foreign policy,lI its 
approaches towards implementing international human rights within its 
own jurisdiction give reasons for rising concerns, confusion and 
lO. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMA.N RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 221 (1988). 
II. Ralph G. Steinhardt, Human Rights Litigation and the 'One-Voice' Orthodoxy in Foreign 
Affairs, in WORLD JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 35 (Mark Gibney 
ed.,1991). 
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misunderstanding. This may cause substantial damage to long-term U.S. 
interests, for human rights issues have become markedly intertwined 
with the issues of democracy and development worldwide, as well as 
international peace and security. 12 
Courts in the U.S. could perform a historic role in the promotion and 
protection of human rights in more than one way. Article VI, Section 2 
of the U.S. Constitution and Paquete Habana as well as civil rights 
development in the U.S.A. provide appropriate opportunities to do it in 
relation to international law to make it exemplary for other countries. 
U.S. courts could become ideal forums for human rights deliberations 
drawing public attention to violations of human rights anywhere in the 
world by individuals and states including the U.S. thus educating public 
minds about human rights. This would make the U.S. Government more 
careful in pursuing foreign policies fraught with risks of human rights 
abuses. 13 
II. SELF-EXECUTING AND NON-SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
While the U.S. Constitution accorded the treaties status of supreme Law 
of the Land, their division into self-executing and non-self-executing, 
and rising tendency of the Senate and the President to declare more of 
them non-self-executing has greatly undermined this constitutional 
position. This division which is not in the Constitution but came as a 
result of the Supreme Court's decision in Foster v. Neilson l4 (1829) made 
a fundamentally substantive impact on the implementation of treaties by 
the United States. The impact has been more acutely felt in relation to 
human rights treaties. The concept of self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties disparages the entire constitutional scheme regarding 
treaties and their implementation. 
Ratified treaties should be self-executing and appears to be the 
constitutional imperative. General wording, vagueness, lack of 
concreteness, mootness, and ambiguity of the intent of parties which 
have been put forward as arguments in Sei Fujii v. Califomid5 (1952) for 
12. Rafiqul Islam, Development as a Human Right - An Economic Analysis from the Third 
World Perspective. in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT 1-16 (Mizanur Rahman ed., 2002). 
13. See Mark Gibney, Couns as 'Teachers in Vital National Seminar' on Human Rights, in 
WORLD JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 81-105 (Mark Gibney ed., 
1991). 
14. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); for details see, Jordan Paust, Self-
Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of 
Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995). 
15. Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). 
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holding Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter regarding human rights 
non-self-executing appear unconvincing, specially in view of the 
subsequent developments of the international human rights law. 16 
All the provisions of a duly ratified treaty have equal force, and hence 
they are equally self-executing. The opposite view would be 
conceptually wrong. Some provisions of a treaty may be more concrete, 
elaborate, and unambiguous than others. Nonetheless, more general and 
less concrete provisions have also a message which is imperative and 
must be self-executing to the extent of what concretely can be made out 
of that message by the court. 
Justiciability and judicial enforceability of the message is to be 
determined by the court. Judges are obligated to consider particular 
message subject to their own understanding of it, the understanding 
being conditioned by the words and spirit of the entire treaty as well as 
principles of international and municipal law. The degree of execution 
would vary with the scale of specificity or concreteness of the provisions, 
but the elements of self-execution ought to be present in all 
circumstances. The view is that if the language of a particular provision 
is clear and direct, it must be executed, call it self-executing or not. On 
the other hand, if the language is general and not direct, it would only be 
executed as far as interpretation of language of the text would permit. 
This view may be argued as closer to constitutional requirements of 
Article 6/2 to which any concept of implementing legislation is alien. 
To make the above argument more explicit, reference can be made to 
Plyer v. Doe and In re Alien Children Education Litigation. 17 Article 
47(a) of the Protocol of Buenos Aires could not be interpreted as to 
provide for direct right to free elementary school education of the 
children of undocumented aliens. This cannot be an argument of its being 
non-self-executing, as it was so held by the court. In fact, provisions of 
the Article 47(a) do not imply that right stricto sensue. However, the 
point is whatever can be made out of the treaty provisions after they are 
judicially interpreted must be self-executing. The court is to decide the 
extent of self-execution. The Article provides, inter alia that: 
The Member States will exert the greatest efforts, in 
accordance with their constitutional processes, to ensure 
16. RICHARD B. LILLICH, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, INVOKING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS 5 (1985). 
17. In re Alien Children Education Litigation 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Plyer v. Doc and In re 
Alien Children Education Utigation were joined by the Supreme Court for the purposes of briefing 
and oral argument.) 
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the effective exercise of the right to education, on the 
following bases: 
a. Elementary education, compulsory for 
children of school age, shall also be offered to 
all others who can benefit from it. When 
provided by the State it shall be without 
charge. IS 
33 
Individual courts' approach towards interpreting the above wordings may 
vary, and a particular court may not consider the right to free education 
arising out of the provision of the protocol applicable to the children of 
undocumented aliens. The other courts may decide otherwise. The point 
is that it does not concern the self-executing nature of the treaties. 
Treaties are supposed to be self-executing to the extent of their letter and 
spirit. 
Support for above contention may be found in the Restatement of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised), 19 which considers 
most treaties to be self-executing. However, the Restatement also makes 
mention of the tradition in the United States of non-self-executing 
treaties. It notes three categories of non-self-executing treaties. First, a 
treaty is non-self-executing if the text "manifests an intention that it shall 
not become effective as domestic" meaning that it would require the 
enactment of implementing legislation. Second, "if the Senate in giving 
consent to a treaty, or Congress by resolution requires implementing 
legislation" the treaty is non-self-executing. Third, a treaty is non-self-
executing "if implementing legislation is constitutionally required."20 
No doubt, the parties to a treaty may manifest an intention that the treaty 
shall not be applied other than by way of implementing legislation. But 
such intention must be clearly laid down in the treaty. Recourse to 
implementing legislation would be made only as a requirement of the 
clear provision of the treaty. Any other course e.g. Senate or the 
President declaring a treaty to be non-self-executing or making a 
reservation to that effect, would seem to be contrary to the Supremacy 
clause of the Constitution regarding treaties. Third category, that of 
constitutional requirement of implementing legislation, is definitely an 
imperative category, but it has been rightly pointed out that "it is the rare 
18. Lillich, supra note 16, at 9. 
19. Id. at 7. 
20. Arthur Rovine, 2001-2002 Proceedings of the American Branch of the International Law 
Association 30-31 (2002). 
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case in which legislation would be said to be constitutionally required, 
although one can think of examples. The raising of money, for instance, 
requires the participation of the House of Representatives; it cannot be 
done merely by entering into treaty."21 
There is an intense debate in the academic circles of the United State on 
whether treaties should be presumed to be self-executing or not. Based 
on historical analysis and on comparative study, Professor Yoo strongly 
argues that the treaties should be presumed to be non-self-executing. He 
contends that the presumption of non-self-execution in the United States 
is also supported by the concept of separation of powers.22 On the other 
hand, Professor Vazquez strongly argues that treaties are self-executing 
because it's there in the constitution.23 Arthur Rovine also seems 
sympathetic to this view. He says, "Given the supremacy clause, and 
given our history ... the two-thirds vote in the Senate is sufficient."24 
It is useful here to recall Secretary of State Livingston who observed 
long back in 1833 that "Government of the United States presumes that 
whenever a treaty has been duly concluded and ratified by the 
acknowledged authorities competent for that purpose, an obligation is 
thereby imposed upon each and every department of the Government, to 
carry it into complete effect, according to its terms, and on the 
performance of this obligation consists the due observance of good faith 
amongst nations."25 
Given that the two-thirds vote in the Senate is required for ratification, 
self-execution of treaties is not likely to pose any problem to domestic 
legal system. This is the legislative balance the Constitution sought to 
establish. Theoretically it may seem uneasy, or even difficult to accept 
that the Supremacy Clause excludes the House of Representative from 
the process, even when the treaty provisions invalidate federal law. 
However, there are other checks and balances. In emergency or dire 
necessity the Congress has the option of reenactment, so it can prevail 
under later-in-time principle, although it may entail violation of 
obligations under treaty. These are all specUlations and distant 
possibilities which may never happen in practice. Should they happen, 
they can be adjusted and adapted accordingly, so the principle of self-
21. [d. at 31. 
22. See lohn C. Y 00, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the 
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L.R. 1955 (1999). 
23. Carlos M. Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, COLUM. L.R. 2169 (1999). 
24. Rovine, supra note 20, at 35. 
25. Cited in Lillich, supra note 16, at 6. 
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execution could be upheld to meet more closely the requirements of the 
Article 6/2 of the Constitution. 
While the Fujii v. California in 1948 made a negative impact on the 
treaties on the question whether they are to be considered self-executing, 
in People of Siagan ex reI. Guerrera v. United States Department of 
Interior6 (1974) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted 
a more reasonable and satisfactory test for determining whether a treaty 
is self-executing. The court observed: 
. . . the extent to which an international agreement 
establishes affIrmative and judicially enforceable 
obligations without implementing legislation must be 
determined in each case by reference to many contextual 
factors: the purpose of the treaty and the objectives of its 
creators, the existence of domestic procedures and 
institutions appropriate for direct implementation, the 
availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement 
methods, and the immediate and long-range social 
consequences of self- or non-self-execution. 27 
Using the above test the Court held that the UN Trusteeship Agreement 
over Micronesia provided the plaintiffs with "direct, affIrmative, and 
judicially enforceable rights" to challenge the execution of a lease 
purportedly in violation of that agreement. 
In Diggs v. Shultrs the former Congressman Diggs challenged the 
legality of Byrd Amendment, permitting the U.S. to resume importing 
Chrome from former Rhodesia in violation of UN Security Council 
resolution No. 232. Although under later-in-time principle, the Byrd 
Amendment prevailed, the U.S. court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia reversing the district court's determination observed that 
plaintiffs had locus standi to bring the action. This observation was 
definitely supportive of the view that international resolution based on 
treaty obligation and the treaty provisions themselves could be directly 
applicable. 29 
26. People of Siagan v. United States Department ofInterior, 502 F.2d 90 (9<l1 Cir. 1974). 
27. Cited in Lillich, supra note 16, at 6. 
28. Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F. 2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
29. Cited in Lillich, supra note 16, at 7. 
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Expectations raised in human rights circles by the above two cases were 
not met in any considerable measure by subsequent developments in the 
judicial circles. 
However, Sannon v. United States,30 Pierre v. United States,31 and 
Coriolan v. Immigration & Naturalization Service32 where self-executing 
nature of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) was 
vigorously advocated by the Plaintiff s Counsel and never denied by the 
court, and Plyer v. Doe which was later joined with In re Alien Children 
Education Litigation33 by the Supreme Court for the purposes of briefing 
and oral argument to shed light on Article 47 of the Protocol of Buenos 
Aires, made some positive contributions towards considering treaties as 
self-executing.34 
However, the crux of the problem in the United States now is not the 
attitude of the courts towards treaties to decide whether they are self-
executing. The real problem seems to be non-ratification of the treaties, 
and when ratified, reservation or declaration to the effect that they are 
non-self-executing. 35 International Covenant .on Civil and Political 
Rights, Genocide Convention, and Convention against Torture are 
presumably self-executing in nature, yet there is declaration by the U.S. 
to the contrary to minimize their domestic impact. Four other 
conventions, namely, Convention against Racial Discrimination, 
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discriminations against 
Women, Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
American Convention on Human Rights, which are awaiting ratification 
would seemingly meet the same fate. Numerous other international 
human rights instruments which have been signed by the U.S.A. may 
languish for years before they are ratified, if they would be ratified, or 
they may not be ratified at all. 
U.S. reluctance to treaty ratification, ratification with reservation or 
declaration and U.S. courts' restrained attitude towards the question of 
self-execution of treaties-all indicate a conservative trend, which does 
not correspond to the constitutional spirit, for Article 6/2 of the 
30. Sannon v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Fla. 1977), vacated by 566 F.2d 104 (5th 
Cir. 1977). 
31. Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1976). 
32. Coriolan v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 559 F.2d. 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1977). 
33. See In re Alien Children Education Litigation 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
34. See Lillich, supra note 16, at 8-9. 
35. Buergenthal, Thomas, op.cit, pp. 213-214, 226-229 ; Hoffman, Paul L. and Strossen, 
Nadine. op.cit., pp. 480-482. 
10
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 10 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/3
2004] INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 37 
Constitution envisages and contemplates that treaties are to be directly 
applied. 
m. ON THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATIES 
While there is little theoretical disagreement on the status of treaties in 
the U.S. Constitution, there have always been attempts not only to 
qualify the process of domestic implementation of treaties, but also to 
narrow down the sphere of federal treaty power.36 This is to a great extent 
explained by the immense impact the supremacy provision of the treaty 
clause of the Constitution is capable of making on the domestic legal 
system. Over-cautious or even fearful of such impact, which is often 
overexaggerated, all branches of the government have often resorted to 
measures in order to minimize the effect of the constitutional position of 
the treaties. Foster v. Nielson on self and non-self-executing nature of 
treaties is only one of them. In doing so, they have pursued policies 
acting in a way, not always in harmony with the vision and mission of 
the Constitution. 
True, there may be instances when liberal interpretation of Art. 6/2 may 
create opportunities for treaties to intrude upon the power of the 
legislature. But there are sufficient constitutional safeguards, tradition of 
judicial restraint in the U.S.A. and later-in-time principle of operation of 
treaty or domestic law, which would allay any fear of such intrusion. 
Nonetheless, there have been serious attempts in the past to exclude 
human right treaties from the purview of treaty power of the federal 
government. This is notwithstanding the fact that Missouri v. HollancP7 
(1920) strongly reaffIrmed the wide range of the treaty power to say that 
the federal treaty power in the Constitution is a separate and independent 
power having no subject matter limit, i.e. not limited by the 10th 
amendment. 
Opponents of wide treaty power especially those who consider human 
rights treaties an intrusion upon both state and federal legislative power 
sought to find constitutional arguments to exclude human right treaties 
from the treaty power. They argued that individual rights (human rights) 
are a matter strictly between the state and its citizens.38 No outside 
36. Attempt to amend the U.S. Constitution in the fifties by 'Bricker Amendment' was a move 
to curtail federal treaty power relating to human rights; see Buergenthal, supra note 10, 215-219; see 
also Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995). 
37. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
38. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 10, at 221. 
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interference is logically or legally permissible. Hence provisions of 
treaties ought not to dictate the relationship between the state and its 
citizens. Treaties are to regulate international matters. Since human 
rights are the concerns of the state and citizens, they are automatically to 
be excluded. Moreover, the argument goes, those issues of human rights 
which are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federating units i.e. 
the states, can in no way be regulated by treaties. To obviate Missouri V. 
Holland, attempts were made in Congress to enforce the Bricker 
amendment without success, but not without revealing a formidable 
opposition against including human rights treaties within federal treaty 
power.39 
Before proceeding further in our deliberations to analyze the lengths and 
breadths of treaty power of the United States, we are obliged to accept 
that the post-world war II international developments have elevated the 
human rights matters to one of great international concerns, which need 
to be dealt with by concerted international efforts, possible only by way 
of undertaking firm international commitments. Since the states (federal 
units) have not been given treaty power, any benefit of the treaties can 
accrue to them only by way of federal treaty making power. 
Although Missouri V. Holland was a land-mark decision which 
entrenched wide range of federal treaty power indicating possibility to 
include human rights and issues falling within state (federal unit) 
jurisdiction, academic attempts to investigate and constitutionally justify 
reasons for such inclusion are not very frequent. One such attempt has 
been very competently made by Professor David Golove of New York 
University School of Law. 40 His main contention is that protection and 
promotion of national interests provide the permissible reasons for 
entering into human rights treaties. 
The object is not to change domestic law by treaty, nor to interfere with 
state jurisdiction through federal treaty power, but to advance national 
interests by treaties which require participation of other countries and 
which, therefore, cannot be achieved by mere legislation of the Congress. 
Golove takes a universal approach to human rights and argues that it is 
one such area which needs international cooperation to pursue national 
goals. For the U.S. the consideration of how much the international 
39. See supra note 36. 
40. Professor David Golove made a comprehensive and illuminating analysis of the issue in 
his draft paper titled Reasons and Treaties: Human Rights Treaties and the U.S. Constitution pre-
sented at a colloquium on Globalization and its Discontents held at the New York University School 
of Law on March 25. 2002. His views have been summarized in the present essay. 
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human rights instruments would contribute to development of human 
rights at home, but more importantly is the improvement of human rights 
abroad. This is more likely to be achieved by U.S. active participation in 
those instruments, paving the way for better securing of U.S. national 
interests in various ways. He argues that improved human rights 
situations in other countries will make them better partners in bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation in various fields. Improved human rights 
situations make the countries less aggressive, economically more 
prospective and politically more acceptable, meaning that U.S.A. have 
more to invest in those countries for mutual gains, and less to spend in 
terms of giving aid, or containing them if they are militarily or otherwise 
aggressive. 
Inducing other countries to binding international agreement entails 
compromises, and may involve costs in terms of imposing international 
standards on domestic law. The aim, Golove continues to argue, is not to 
enact domestic law which is the exclusive jurisdiction of the legislature, 
but to attain certain national objectives which can only be done by way 
of treaty-making, which is primarily an executive function. Two-third 
Senate majority is a formidable check on executive treaty power. It's a 
minority veto in the Senate to secure protection of the jurisdiction of the 
states. The founding fathers of the Constitution foresaw gradual 
expansion of issues of international concern which affect the interests of 
the United States as an independent and sovereign state as well as the 
interests of the individual states as federating units. The Constitution 
entitled the federal government to protect those interests by treaty-power. 
Professor Golove seeks to strengthen his theory of national interests and 
permissible reasons for entering into human rights treaties by more 
idealistic arguments of cosmopolitan moral concern, and mutual 
commitment and moral community, meaning that human rights issues 
anywhere are a concern everywhere. We are mutually committed to 
resolve these issues, if we want to build up a moral community of 
nations, Golove insists. As for human rights issues, we witness a gradual 
but steady evolution of a global legislative process from which no state 
can alienate itself. This is the imperative of modern development of 
international human rights law. 
The U.S. Constitution has remained over the years a uniquely sacred 
document, a constant source of inspiration, strength and stability for the 
polity and the society it has been discovered and rediscovered again and 
again by way of interpretation to justify laws accommodating changing 
values of the society. It has rarely failed in its interpretation to 
progressively move the society. It WOUld, therefore, seem peculiar, if not 
13
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incomprehensible, when constitutional argument is put forward against 
the application of any international human rights standard domestically. 
There are very few international human rights norms which are not 
reflected in the U.S. domestic law.41 Some of them may be directly 
applied. Some would qualify for domestic application by progressive 
interpretation of existing domestic law. International norms which would 
contradict domestic laws can be brought under RUDs clause, not to 
impede general application of international instruments within domestic 
legal system. Even if certain international norms would supersede 
domestic norms under last-in-time principle, costs of such supersession 
could be favorably compared to the costs of negative international impact 
which non-ratification or ratification with sweeping RODs, or non-
application of international instruments would entail. 
Paul Hoffman and Nadine Strossen would argue: 
If the United States had ratified the ICCPR without 
limitations on its rights-enhancing provisions, it would 
have expanded the rights of Americans in the following 
significant respects: prohibiting the execution of juvenile 
offenders and of pregnant women; incorporating 
international standards of cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment and punishment into U.S. law; requiring the 
retroactive imposition of lighter criminal penalties; 
affording compensation for unlawful arrests and for 
convictions resulting from the miscarriage of justice; and 
requiring jails and prisons to separate juvenile from adult 
offenders and defendants awaiting trial from those who 
had already been convicted. 
None of these more protective human rights standards 
would have had a huge impact on the United States law 
and practice; however, these are significant protections 
accepted by United States treaty partners and the 
international community. There is no compelling reason 
why the United States should not give full effect to these 
internationalobligations.42 
Since treaty norms are constitutionally considered laws of the land, 
greater reliance ought to be put on the courts for their application. 
Whether private rights of action can arise out of an international 
41. Rogers, supra note 9. 
42. Hoffman and Strossen, supra note 8, at 492. 
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agreement can also be decided by the courts. Court would presumably 
decide such issues on the basis of individual cases; and the court has in 
fact decided such questions in Refugee cases.43 
Nature and extent of implementation of international instruments is 
greatly influenced and even predetermined by the policies the United 
States pursues in relation to such implementation, and the US. policies 
seem more conservative than liberal. While there seems nothing wrong 
with international human rights law, U.S. policies conservatively 
influence its application.44 This may be explained by various factors e.g., 
more familiarity with one's own laws and apparent ease with which they 
can be interpreted and applied; national ego and tendency to consider 
one's own laws superior in quality to anything external, and hence the 
desire to safeguard one's own; uncertainty to apply anything from 
outside; apprehension that the judiciary would gain more power in 
applying treaties directly; and the legislative fear that it may be bypassed. 
IV. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN US. COURTS 
As customary norms of international law are regarded in the United 
States as part of the law of the land, potentially the US. Courts have 
great opportunities to apply international law of human rights directly. 45 
However, these opportunities have not been realized in expected measure 
in practice. This is explained not so much by lack of understanding and 
recognition of the customary norms of international law by US. courts, 
as it is by lack of their enthusiasm to apply them. Yet, the US. courts 
have decided cases which indicate the power the courts can marshal to 
give justice based on customary norms. 
To underline US. recognition of some definitely existing international 
norms of human rights, the often cited document is the U.S. memorial to 
the International Court of Justice in the Hostages Case.46 Arguing about 
the nature and scope of fundamental human rights, the memorial 
observed: 
It has been [contended] that no such standard can or 
should exist, but such force as that position may have 
had gradually diminished as recognition of the existence 
43. See supra notes 30, 31 and 32. 
44. Forsythe, supra note 7, 21-48. 
45. See, David F. Klein, A Theory for the Application of the Customary International Law of 
Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'LL. 332 (Summer 1988). 
46. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 
24). 
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of certain fundamental human rights has spread 
throughout the international community. The existence 
of such fundamental rights for all human beings, 
nationals and aliens alike, and the existence of a 
corresponding duty on the part of every state to respect 
and observe them, are now reflected, inter alia, in the 
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and corresponding 
portions of the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights.... In view of the Universal 
contemporary recognition that such fundamental human 
rights exist . ... Iran's obligation to provide "the most 
constant protection and security" to United States 
nationals in Iran include an obligation to observe those 
rights.47 
The memorial cited Articles 3, 5, 7, 9, 12 and 13 of the Declaration, and 
Articles 7, 9, 10 and 12 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, as evidence of the fundamental human rights to which all 
individuals are entitled and which all states must guarantee. These 
articles cover, respectively, the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment; the right to liberty and security of 
person and the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention; the right to 
privacy and the right to freedom of movement. 
The memorial's focus was not the self or non-self-executing nature of the 
relevant provisions of the UN Charter or the ICCPR but the conviction 
that these provisions along with similar provisions of UDHR have 
become customary norms of international law to which U.S. totally 
subscribe, and are bound to apply them directly as law of the land. 
However, the U.S. courts are generally hesitant and reluctant to apply 
customary law of human rights directly. Professors Anne Bayefsky and 
Joan Fitzpatrick write: 
United States courts generally manifest a deep reluctance 
to embrace international human rights law and to use it 
as an effective tool to redress abuses. This reluctance is 
born partly of unfamiliarity and perhaps a degree of 
intellectual laziness, but it also appears to stem from 
47. Cited in Hoffman and Strossen. supra note 8, at 484. 
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concerns about institutional competence and deference 
to the political branches.48 
43 
As with other two organs of the state, the U.S. courts' attitude towards 
invoking customary international human rights law is also characterized 
by over-cautiousness, extra-ordinary attachment to their own laws which 
they consider sufficient to meet the requirements of international human 
rights law, and by taking of a liberal view of various doctrines i.e. 
political question, acts of state, sovereign immunity, forum non 
conveniens, non-justiciability, to defer issues to political branches. 
Moreover, it is not always easy to establish beyond reasonable doubt that 
certain norm has become customary norm to be regarded as law. The 
amount of minimum judicial activism or intellectual exercise which is 
necessary to prove custom as law, is not always found in the minds and 
hearts of the judges. This explains why there are not many international 
custom based judicial decisions in the U.S.A., in spite of the fact that 
international customary law is part of the law of the land. However, 
Filartiga and Fernandez provided great promises of setting new trends. 
In Filartiga v. Pena-lrala49 the U.S. court of Appeal for the Second 
Circuit gave relief to the plaintiffs basing its decision on customary 
international law. The plaintiffs who were of Paraguayan origin, one of 
them at that time living permanently in New York, filed a suit in a 
federal district court against another citizen of Paraguay, then on a visit 
to U.S.A, for the torture and death of their son and brother basing their 
claim on the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) of 1789, which says that "the 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States."50 
The question before the court was whether or not torture violated the law 
of nations, i.e., customary international law as then existing. The district 
court dismissed the complaint, which was reversed by the appellate 
court. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was of the opinion 
that the A TS created implied cause of action for violation of customary 
international human rights standards holding "an act of torture 
committed by a state official against one held in detention violates 
established norms of international law of human rights, and hence the 
48. Cited in [d. 
49. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980). 
50. Cited in Lillich, supra note 16, at 12. 
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law of nations."51 The Court cited many international instruments 
including specially Article 5 of UDHR to conclude that torture was 
outlawed by the law of nations. Additionally, the Court also referred to 
modern municipal laws and works of jurists to support its view. The' 
Court used huge materials to provide proof that opinio juris necessary for 
customs to be recognized as law was overwhelmingly in favor of torture 
being prohibited by the law of nations, and hence subject to prosecution. 
In conclusion, the Court stated that "the prohibition is clear and 
unambiguous, and admits of no distinction between treatment of aliens 
and citizens. "52 
The decision in Filartiga was thought to be capable of leading to far 
reaching consequences, and raised expectations that the courts would 
increasingly resort to customary international norms to provide justice to 
the victims of violation of human rights, citizens or aliens. Expectations, 
however, did not materialize in significant measure. 53 Judge Kaufman 
who was mainly responsible for the land-mark decision in Filartiga 
cautioned later in an article that the decision's purpose and sphere of 
application was relatively narrow. He observed that it should not be 
misread or exaggerated to support sweeping assertions that all (or even 
most) international human rights norms found in the UDHR or 
international human rights treaties have ripened into customary 
international law enforceable in the U.S. courts.54 
These cautious or even pessimistic statements proved more than what 
they actually meant to caution. Barring few instances which again 
involved foreign plaintiffs and defendants, and torture as cause of action, 
Filartiga could not generate much momentum for customary 
international law as a dynamic source of law. No doubt that torture has 
been established beyond reasonable doubt as prohibited under customary 
international law, but that the Filartiga was expected to explore other 
breaches of human rights based on customary law has not materialized. 
Following Fila rtiga , several such cases involving torture and 
compensation were, in fact, successfully instituted in the courts of U.S.A. 
Of them, Marcos litigation merits special mention. The case consolidated 
five separate civil suits filed in three different judicial districts, all 
alleging various forms of human rights abuses under Ferdinand Marcos's 
51. Id.at 13. 
52. Id .. 
53. Hoffman and Strossen, supra note 8, at 485; see also Gordon A. Christenson, The Uses of 
Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 39,40 (1981). 
54. Lillich, supra note 16, at 13. 
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reign in Philippines. All five cases were dismissed by the district courts 
on the basis of the Act of State doctrine, which the Ninth Circuit reversed 
and consolidated the cases for triaP5 
On the other hand, when similar cases involved U.S. officials, the 
judiciary was reluctant, and decided negatively to award relief. In 
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan56 involving high U.S. officials including the 
then President Ronald Reagan, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' 
suit on the basis of political question doctrine. In Nejad v. United 
States,57 Koohi v. U.S.,5s In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster9 
in Bhopal, the courts decided not to assert jurisdiction basing their 
decision either on political question doctrine, or sovereign immunity, or 
forum non conveniens. Of them Union Carbide, which involved 20000 
people dead and more than 200,000 injured, was very significant, 
indicating court's bias for big business.60 
Writing on the U.S. courts' attitude in litigation involving U.S. 
government officials and private companies, Mark Gibney observes: 
... while American Courts have been very good at 
protecting the human rights of a very small and select 
group of foreign plaintiffs (those alleging human rights 
violations by foreign state actors over whom personal 
jurisdiction has been obtained), U.S. courts have not 
been willing to consider the possibility of attempting to 
make whole those harmed by American actors. Until this 
happens, it is not possible to claim that American Courts 
are staunch defenders of human rights.61 
The U.S. Congress, however, showed keen apprecIation of the 
developments by enacting in 1992 Torture Victim Protection Act 
(TVPA). It and expands the coverage of ATS. But the TVPA is focused 
55. See Mark Gibney, U.S. Courts and the Selective Protection of Human Rights, in JUDICIAL 
PROTECfION OF HUMAN RIGHTS MYTH OR REALITY 178-179 (Mark Gibney & Stanislaw 
Frankowski eds., 1999). 
56. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), affd 770 F. 2d 202 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985). 
57. Nejad v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 753 (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
58. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir 1992). 
59. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F. 2d 195 (2nd cir.) 
60. Gibney, supra note 55, at 183-184. 
61. [d. at 186. 
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on torture and summary execution committed by foreign officials 
abroad.62 
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson63 involved more direct use of 
customary norm of international law by U.S. courts. A federal district 
court in Kansas granted a writ of habeas corpus to a Cuban who the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service had determined was ineligible 
for admission into the U.S., and who pending his deportation was 
detained in the U.S. Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas. Counsel for 
the plaintiff Fernandez argued that his client's continued confinement, 
without bail and without having been charged with a crime in the United 
States, violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth and Eighth 
Amendments. 
However, the court found that Fernandez as an 'excludable' alien could 
not be protected by the U.S. Constitution, or any domestic law, 
notwithstanding that his detention was prima facie arbitrary. The court 
regretted that "in the case of unadmitted aliens detained on our soil, but 
legally deemed to be outside our borders, the machinery of domestic law 
utterly fails to operate to assure protection."64 
Nevertheless, the district court ordered his release on the basis of 
customary international law. The court held that "customary international 
law secures to petitioner the right to be free of arbitrary detention,"65 
adding further that: 
Our review of the sources from which customary 
international law derived clearly demonstrates that 
arbitrary detention is prohibited by customary 
international law. Therefore, even though indeterminate 
detention of an excluded alien cannot be said to violate 
the United States Constitution or our statutory laws, it is 
judicially remedial as a violation of international law. 
Fernandez was a significant step forward in independent and direct use 
by the courts of customary international law as basis of its decision.66 On 
appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the 
decision of the lower court, but on a different ground or rationale, 
62. Hoffman and Strossen, supra note 8, at 486. 
63. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), affd on other 
grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). 
64. Cited in Lillich, supra note 16, at 14. 
65. [d. 
66. Hoffman and Strossen, supra note 8, at 486487; Lillich, op.cit., p. 14. 
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thereby undermining the ratio decidendi of the district court. The court 
construed the Immigration and Naturalization Act as not permitting 
indefinite detention of an excludable alien. However, in obiter dicta the 
court noted that it was proper "to consider international law principles 
for notions of fairness as to propriety of holding aliens in detention. No 
principle of international law is more fundamental than the concept that 
human beings should be free from arbitrary imprisonment."67 Citing 
relevant international instruments the Court referred to customary 
international law to support its construction of the Statute. In short, the 
court interpreted and applied domestic law illuminated by international 
law. 
It is not insignificant that while the court of appeal upheld district court's 
decision, it decided, unlike the latter, not to consider customary 
international law as source of law. The appellate courts understanding of 
and sympathy for the customary international is clear, yet the court was 
unable to base its decision directly on international law. It yet again is 
explained by the general attitude of the courts similar to other organs of 
the state, which is characterized by reluctance, over-cautiousness and 
conservatism in applying international law within domestic legal system. 
In In re Alien Children Education Litigation,68 the district court 
demonstrated similar attitude. In both cases, the courts (trial and appeal) 
recognized the contents and importance of customary international law, 
but based their decisions on domestic law, the decision that could have 
been taken on the basis of customary international law, as it was so 
advocated for. However, the influence of international law is clear, 
which itself is a progressive development in the implementation of 
international law in state territories. 
It may be hoped that with numerous mentions of or references to 
international law when such mention or reference is supportive of 
particular construction of domestic law, and sometimes with use of 
international law as source of law with no risk of its being in conflict 
with national law, the psychological barrier against direct application of 
international human rights law would be overcome. 
67. Cited in Lillich, supra note 16, at 15. 
68. 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd unreported men, (5 th cir. 1981), affd. 457, U.S. 
202 (1982). 
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V. INTERPRETATIVE VALUE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 
While the U.S. Courts have not shown much enthusiasm in directly 
applying international human rights law by regarding a particular treaty 
self-executing when the decision to determine the self-execution is 
dependent on court's decision, or while the courts have not actively 
relied on customary international law for deciding cases, they have 
frequently cited international human rights standards and principles to 
illuminate constitutional and statutory norms.69 Given the traditional 
conservative and cautious attitude of the U.S. organs and agencies in 
applying international human rights law with the practice of construing 
domestic law when necessary in the light of international law is indeed 
an encouraging development. The picture becomes all the more 
welcoming for the enforcement of international human rights law when 
one remembers that "an Act of Congress ought never to be construed to 
violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains."70 
To quote Professor Richard B. Lillich, 
Far more likely than a court's holding that the human 
rights clauses of the UN Charter are self-executing - far 
more likely even than a court's holding that a particular 
article of the Universal Declaration now reflects 
customary international law - is the possibility that a 
court will regard international human rights law as 
infusing U.S. constitutional and statutory standards with 
its normative content. This 'indirect incorporation' of 
both conventional and customary international human 
rights law is an exceptionally interesting and promising 
approach warranting greater attention than it has 
received of late.71 
Oyama V. California72 (1948) is one of the major cases decided more 
than half a century ago, which indicates great interpretative value of 
international norm. Striking down a portion of the California Alien Land 
Law as contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, two justices of the 
Supreme Court Justice Murphy and Justice Rutledge in a concurring 
69. Henkin, supra note 3, at 198; see Lillich, supra note 16, at 16-18; see Jordan J. Paust, On 
Human Rights: The Use of Human Right Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective 
Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543 (1989). 
70. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 92 (Cranch) 64,118 (1804). 
71. Lillich, supra note 16, at 16. 
72. 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
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opinion remarked that the statute's "inconsistency with [Article 55(3) 7] 
the Charter, which has been duly ratified and adopted by the United 
States, is but one more reason why the statute must be condemned. "73 
Two concurring justices, Justice Black and Justice Douglas wondered 
"how could the U.S. be faithful to its international pledge, if the state 
laws which bar land ownership and occupancy by aliens on account of 
race are permitted to be enforced."74 Similarly in Namba v. McCoud5 
(1949) the Supreme Court of Oregon referred to Art. 55 of the UN 
Charter, in support of its decision that the Oregon Alien Land Law was 
violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
both the cases the court recognized the significance of international law, 
based its decision on domestic law, giving the latter an interpretation 
enlightened by the former. 
It is clear that U.S. courts feel freer to refer to international human rights 
law in domestic litigation not as source of law, but as supporting its 
domestic law contention. In practice, the courts have often referred to 
UDHR and the Charter. Academics and scholars have also stressed the 
importance of interpretative use of international human rights law in 
domestic litigation. 
Surveying the interpretive use of customary international human rights 
norms by U.S. courts, Professor Jordan Paust of University of Houston 
Law Center wrote in 1982 that "most of the Supreme Court Justices 
throughout United States constitutional history have recognized that 
human rights can provide useful content for the identification, 
clarification and supplementation of constitutional or statutory norms. "76 
He also noted that the Supreme Court's interpretive use of customary 
international human rights norms has been steadily increasing. Court's 
increasing familiarity with and reference to international law to inform 
domestic law are likely to prepare the ground for more direct application 
of international human rights law, both treaty and customary. 
On the other hand, Professor Bayefsky and Fitzpatrick expressmg 
skepticism about the above prospect wrote: 
Those courts which do make use of international law 
sources as an aid to interpretation usually (a) do not tend 
73. Cited in Lillich. supra note 16, at 488. 
74. Cited in Id. 
75. Namba v. Court, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949). 
76. Cited in Hoffman and Strossen, supra note 8, at 488. 
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to justify its introduction by references to the principle 
of consistency with international obligations, nor (b) 
concern themselves with establishing the binding quality 
of the source by proving that it is truly customary 
international law. This tendency impedes the 
development of clear and consistent principles 
concerning the interpretive relevance and importance of 
customary human rights norms in U.S. law. l1 
Paul L. Hoffman and Nadime Strossen regret that while the Supreme 
Court in Thompson V. Oklahoma78 in 1988 invoked international human 
rights standards to conclude that juvenile death penalty constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth Amendment, and held that 
a death sentence imposed on a offender who was fifteen years old at the 
time of committing the offence violated the Eighth Amendment, the 
same court later in Stanford V. Kentucky79 (1989) held different opinion 
to conclude that the Eight Amendment does not bar the imposition of the 
death penalty on someone who was 16 or 17 years old at the time of 
committing the crime in question.80 
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote: 
We emphasize that it is American conceptions of 
decency that are dispositive, rejecting the contention of 
petitioners and their various amici that the sentencing 
practices of other countries are relevant. While 
"practices of other nations, particularly other 
democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a 
practice uniform among our people is not merely an 
historical accident but rather so implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty that it occupies a place not merely in our 
mores, but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well," 
they cannot serve to establish the first Eighth 
Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted 
among our people.8! 
Supreme Court's judgment in any particular case may be disappointing, 
but the U.S. courts in general do rely on interpretive value of 
international human rights norms. Richard B. Lillich suggested that 
77 . Cited in Id. 
78. Thompson V. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
79. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
80. Hoffman and Strossen, supra note 8, at 489-490. 
81. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,370 n.l, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 2975 n.l (1989). 
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considering the generally cautious and rather conservative and reluctant 
attitude of the U.S. courts, at least at that stage, interpretative use of 
international human rights norms is more advisable of way of enforcing 
those norms.82 He expressed apprehension that too much advocating and 
pursuing the cause of direct application of treaty or customary norms, or 
taking of any radical decision as it so happened with district court in Sei 
Fujii, may turn out to be counter-productive. He suggested rather a slow 
and step by step approach towards invoking international human rights in 
domestic courts, fIrst as illuminating domestic law, and then, where 
appropriate and situation more permissive, as direct source of law. He 
believed progress in direct application of international human rights law 
by domestic court is more likely to be achieved by this calculative 
lawyering than by vehement advocacy for direct application. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The relevant provisions in the U.S. Constitution are congenial to 
domestic enforcement of international human rights law. However, 
government policies in the United States have not been very responsive 
to these provisions; rather the organs of the government have always 
taken a conservative view of the constitutional position. 
In view of the Bill of Rights constitutionally guaranteed to the U.S. 
citizens, and U.S. contribution towards the cause of human rights 
worldwide, and their readiness to promote and protect human rights 
abroad, it is difficult to understand why the U.S. government is reluctant 
to ratify international human rights instruments, or ratify them with 
numerous reservations, understandings and declarations (RUDs). Wide 
power of the executive to declare any treaty non-self-executing has also 
squeezed the scope of direct application of treaties as envisaged by the 
Constitution. All these send a wrong message to the international 
community regarding U.S. position on human rights. 
Moreover, the U.S. courts' general attitude to consider treaties more as 
non-self-executing rather than self-executing when they are called upon 
to decide on such questions and a general reluctance to refer to 
international customs as sources of law is signifIcant. The U.S. as a 
major power and promoter of human rights cannot pursue such policy 
without having negative impact on other countries. 
On the other hand, treaty clauses of the U.S. Constitution and Paquete 
Habana ruling on customary norm of international law as part of the law 
82. Lillich, supra note 16, at 17-18. 
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of the land accompanied by constitutional proclamation of Bill of Rights 
provide the most ideal situation of domestic enforcement of international 
human rights law in the U.S.A. The U.S. courts have on occasion's 
revealed great potential of courts to apply norms of international law. 
There are very few international human rights norms which are not 
available within U.S. domestic legal system. This makes the possibility 
of any conflict between domestic and international law insignificantly 
small. A shift in U.S. policy on implementation of international human 
rights instruments could go a long way to influence and promote 
domestic enforcement of international human rights law in other national 
jurisdictions. A policy shift would also further enhance interpretative use 
of international human rights norms by U.S. courts, which they do to 
illuminate domestic law, to prepare the ground for substantial use of 
international norms as source of law to be directly applied by U.S. 
courts. 
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